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To PIERCE OR NOT TO PIERCE? WHEN IS THE QUESTION.
DEVELOPING A FEDERAL RULE OF DECISION FOR
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL UNDER
CERCLA
In 1980, as part of an ongoing trend in environmental legislation,1
Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund).2 CERCLA provides
a uniform response mechanism to contend with environmental contami-
nation produced by hazardous substances.3 The statute's goal, remedial
in nature, is the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites.' Its liability
provision5 shifts response costs to the parties responsible for the
1. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. 1987), emerges as part of a chain of federal environmental legislation.
Congress initiated this process with the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1970), the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1972), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6992k (1976), (regulating hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal), and the Toxic
Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1978), (focusing on the production of new
chemicals).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. 1987), as amended by Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499 (Oct. 17, 1986).
3. As its preamble indicates, CERCLA's goal is "[t]o provide for liability, compensation,
cleanup, and emergency response for hazardous substances released into the environment and the
cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites." Preamble, Superfund, Pub. L. No. 96-510
(1989).
4. Stafford, Why Superfund Was Needed, EPA J., June 1981, at 9. Senator Robert Stafford, a
sponsor of the Superfund bill, summarized the motivation behind the Senate bill: Superfund was
intended to "respond to emergencies caused by chemical poisons, and to seek to discourage the
release of those chemicals into the environment." Id. at 10. Moreover, Stafford's comments analo-
gizing Superfund to natural disaster assistance programs reinforce the notion that the Act is funda-
mentally remedial in scope. Id. Thus, rather than establishing standards or regulations for the
disposal of hazardous waste, Superfund concentrates on cleaning up the contamination resulting
from inadequate disposal practices.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. 1987). Section 9607(a) specifies the following:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set
forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or oper-
ated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treat-
ment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous
substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility
or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to dis-
posal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from
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pollution.
The liability mechanism appears straightforward. It imposes liability
on a discrete group of individuals associated with the hazardous waste
contamination. 6 Yet when a party seeks recovery from a parent corpora-
tion for contamination produced by a subsidiary, courts have difficulty
applying the standards. The source of the difficulty lies in interpreting
CERCLA's liability provisions in light of traditional corporate law con-
cepts, which dictate an almost unswerving respect for the integrity of the
corporate form.7 Because of this respect for the corporate form, courts
hesitate to impose liability upon shareholders, corporate or individual.
Exceptions exist, however, and the courts, both state and federal,8 have
developed standards for "piercing the corporate veil." 9
In developing standards for piercing the corporate veil in the CER-
CLA context, courts have attempted to fashion a federal rule of deci-
sion 0 that will serve the goals of CERCLA while remaining faithful to
corporate law tradition. Whether a court is willing to disregard the cor-
porate form often depends on which of these two aspects the court places
greater emphasis.
This Note examines the two existing standards for disregarding the
corporate entity to impose liability under CERCLA:"1 1) an alter ego
theory based on the general corporate law doctrine; and 2) a direct liabil-
ity theory based on the statute's "owner/operator" language. Part I de-
scribes the statutory framework of CERCLA with particular attention
which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response
costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (Supp. 1987).
6. See supra note 5.
7. A fundamental purpose of incorporating a business enterprise is the advantage of limiting
the investors' liability for the debts of the company. See, eg., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(6)
(Supp. 1988); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402(b) (McKinney Supp. 1990). For a recent article extol-
ling the economic virtues of limited liability, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. C. L. REv. 89 (1985).
8. For a fine overview of state and federal alter-ego standards, see Note, Piercing the Corporate
Law Veil- The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 853 (1982).
9. This Note utilizes the terms "piercing the corporate veil," "alter ego" liability, "disregard
of the corporate entity," and similar phrases interchangeably. The varying terminology implies no
semantic difference.
10. United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989); United States v.
Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1200-1202 (E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford
Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 30-34 (D. Mass. 1987). Contra Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James &
Co., 696 F. Supp. 222, 226 (W.D. La. 1988) (Fifth Circuit standard for alter ego liability identical to
state standard).
11. See infra Parts II and III.
[Vol. 68:733
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given to the statute's liability provision. Part II traces the development
of the more restrictive alter ego standard. Part III focuses on liability
derived from the statute's owner/operator language. Part IV assesses the
advantages and disadvantages of these two approaches in light of the
goals of CERCLA and the common law alter ego doctrine. After weigh-
ing the needs served by the two approaches and in the absence of a clear
congressional directive, this Note concludes that the less stringent
owner/operator formula is preferable. However, because the balance
struck between the two alternatives only narrowly favors the
owner/operator standard, this Note further suggests that Congress must
clarify the scope of parent liability under CERCLA.
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Beginning in the early 1970s, concern for the environment assumed a
focal position in the mind of the American public.12 As a result, Con-
gress passed, over the course of the past two decades, a series of statutes
designed to address environmental problems. 3 CERCLA developed out
of deep concern about the absence of national regulation governing haz-
ardous substance releases, particularly from inactive or abandoned
sites.14 Despite the importance of the subject matter, 5 the final bill was
12. The year 1970 initiated what some commentators term "the environmental decade." F.
Anderson, D. Mandelker & A. Tarlock, Environmental Protection: Law and Policy 6 (unpublished
manuscript). These authors suggest two primary reasons for the sudden surge in environmental
awareness: the contamination of suburban communities to which many had fled to escape inner-city
pollution and the growth in the chemical industry. .Id. at 6-7 (citing 10 CEQ Am. REP. 1-15
(1979)).
A 1980 study commissioned by the Council on Environmental Quality, the Departments of En-
ergy and Agriculture, and the Environmental Protection Agency revealed that the environmental
movement has maintained the momentum achieved in the early 1970s. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMEN-
TAL QUALITY, PUBLIC OPINION ON ENVIRONMENTAL IssuEs 41 (1980). The Council concluded
that the Opinion Research Corporation's 1977 advice continued to hold true: "business... [must]
learn ... that environmental protection no longer is the exclusive domain of a handful of...
environmental activists, but the continuing concern of the public as a whole." Id. at 43-45.
13. See supra note 1.
14. Stafford, supra note 4, at 9-10. To a large extent, the public and Congress reacted to a series
of environmental disasters: closure of parts of the Great Lakes to commercial fishing due to chemi-
cal contamination; the contamination of a large percentage of drinking water and irrigation wells in
the San Joaquin Valley from pesticides; and the infamous Love Canal incident. Id.
Senator Mitchell, a sponsor of the final bill, stated that Superfund "represents a positive step in
controlling the spread of chemical wastes, cleaning up inactive dumpsites as well as ongoing releases
of hazardous substances into the environment." 126 CONG. REc. S30,114 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1980),
reprinted in 3 ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIV. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF
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not enacted until the last hours of the 96th Congress and represents a last
minute compromise between the Senate and the House. 16
Hastily and broadly drafted, CERCLA is an ambiguous statute.
Moreover, because Congress passed the bill in such limited time, the leg-
islative history provides little guidance to clarify its open-ended provi-
sions.17 Thus, the courts are left to fill in the gaps."8
Section 107 sets forth the terms for liability under CERCLA.' 9 The
Act creates four broad categories of persons subject to liability: present
owners and operators; owners and operators at the time of disposal; per-
sons who arranged for disposal; and transporters who selected the site.?'
Because of the statute's broad language, creative government attorneys
1980 (SUPERFUND), at 201 (1983) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CERCLA]. See also
State ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1311-12 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (legislative history of
the Act indicates concern for existing and abandoned sites).
15. Senator Mitchell underscored the urgent need for such legislation by noting the Surgeon
General's suggestion "that toxic wastes may be the most serious threat to public health in our coun-
try in the next decades." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CERCLA, supra note 14, at 202.
16. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CERCLA, supra note 14, at 199.
17. Both courts and commentators recognize that CERCLA's provisions lack clear guidelines
and that the legislative history adds little to clarify them. In re Acushnet River & New Bedford
Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 25-26 n.2 (D. Mass. 1987) (collecting cases); United States v.
Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985). See also Reed, CERCLA 1985: A Litigation Update,
ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,395 (1985) [hereinafter CERCLA 1985]; Note, Liability of Par-
ent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages, 99 HARV. L. REV. 986, 987 (1986).
CERCLA's amendments in 1986-the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA), Pub. L. No. 99499-failed to clarify the scope of liability in the parent/subsidiary context.
Burt, Cost-Recovery Actions After the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, in
MINIMIZING LIABILITY FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT 167 (ALI-ABA Apr. 1987) (Over-
view of liability provision changes).
18. See Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1988)
(noting that CERCLA's sponsors intended courts to utilize common law to supplement statutory
gaps); United States v. Dart Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1988); New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985). One commentator notes that CERCLA "has been
shaped in court more than any other federal pollution control statute." CERCLA 1985, supra note
17, at 10,395.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (Supp. 1987). For full text of the provision, see supra note 5.
Courts generally construe the provision expansively in order to impose liability and recover
cleanup costs. See, eg., Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 671 (D. Idaho 1986) ("Congress
did not intend a restrictive reading of CERCLA"); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032,
1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (establishing standard of strict liability); United States v. A & F Materials Co.,
578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255-57 (S.D. 11. 1984) (establishing joint and several liability); United States v.
South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984) (holding lessees who
operated facility liable as owners); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp.
823, 843-45 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (adopting standard of strict liability), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810
F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657, supra note 5.
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often seek to impose liability on parent corporations for contamination
caused by their subsidiaries.21 The courts thus find it necessary to iden-
tify the circumstances under which to disregard the subsidiary's corpo-
rate form.
A threshold inquiry involves whether to utilize state veil-piercing stan-
dards or develop a federal rule of decision. Courts addressing the issue
choose federal over state law.2 2 Their reason is that the need for even-
handed imposition of a nationwide standard of liability outweighs any
problems presented by a disregard for state law.2" However, despite
agreement on the need for a federal standard for disregarding the corpo-
rate entity, courts are split on the form the rule should take. Courts
premise their decision whether to pierce the corporate veil under CER-
CLA on one of two theories of liability: 1) an alter ego theory or 2) a
direct liability theory.24
21. Government attorneys have sought strict, joint and several liability in suits against corpora-
tions as well as direct liability of officers and shareholders. CERCLA 1985, supra note 17, at 10,295,
10,401 n.68 (citing EPA memorandum from Courtney M. Price on Liability of Corporate Share-
holders and Successor Corporations for Abandoned Sites Under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (unpublished)). Moreover, after the passage
of SARA and the addition of a settlement provision, 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (Supp. 1987), the EPA still
saw "aggressive use" of its judicial enforcement authority as a significant tool in compelling private
party cleanups and cajoling settlement. EPA Memorandum from J. Winston Porter and Thomas L.
Adams, Jr. on Interim Guidance: Streamlining the CERCLA Settlement Decision Process (Feb. 12,
1987), reprinted in MINIMIZING LIABILIrY FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT, at 63, 66
(ALI-ABA Apr. 1987).
22. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979) held that when a federal
statute fails to provide a particular rule of law, federal courts have the authority to fashion a federal
common law rule. See also United States v. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
("when a federal statute is silent as to the choice of law to be applied, but overriding federal interests
exist, courts should fashion uniform rules of decision.") (citing Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,
318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943)).
23. United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. at 1201-1202; United States v. Kayser-Roth
Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings,
675 F. Supp. 22, 31-32 (D. Mass. 1987) ("One can hardly imagine a federal program more demand-
ing of national uniformity than environmental protection.").
In resolving the state/federal law question, the courts seek guidance from Kimbell Foods, which
sets forth a three prong test for determining when a federal rule is necessary: first, the need for
national uniformity; second, "whether application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of
the federal program"; and third, "the extent to which application of a federal rule would disrupt
commercial relationships predicated on state law." Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-29. Interest-
ingly, it was a student who first advocated adopting a federal rule of decision based on the Kimbell
Foods test. See Note, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages,
99 HARV. L. REv. 986, 999-1003 (1986).
24. See infra Parts II and III.
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II. THE COMMON LAW ALTER EGO ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
The applicability of the common law alter ego doctrine to CERCLA's
liability provisions initially arose in the jurisdictional context.25 Non-
resident parent corporations became targets of complaints alleging re-
sponsibility for environmental contamination attributed to their subsidi-
aries.26 -Many of these complaints against parent corporations were
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.27 In assessing whether the
parent's contacts with the state satisfied personal jurisdiction require-
ments, the courts focused on the degree of "separateness" between the
parent and the subsidiary.28 Highlighting such factors as the intermin-
gling of finances, the adequacy of the subsidiary's capitalization, and the
maintenance of corporate formalities,29 courts adopted a test analogous
to that utilized in the typical veil-piercing situation.30 If the resident sub-
25. Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Mo. 1985); United States v.
Bliss, 108 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Mo. 1985). See also infra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
26. In Bliss, the government sought recovery from a group of associated corporations: Syntex
Corporation, organized under Panamanian law, Syntex Laboratories, Inc. and Syntex (U.S.A.), Inc.,
both incorporated in Delaware. The government contended that these corporations exercised con-
trol over a polluting subsidiary, Syntex Agribusiness. Bliss, 108 F.R.D. at 129, 131. The basis for
seeking recovery from this group arose from a complex series of corporate acquisitions and reorgani-
zations which created a chain of ownership linking each of the parties. Id. at 132. Wehner involved
a private action for response costs against the same subsidiary. Wehner, 616 F. Supp. at 28.
Although Syntex (U.S.A.) and Syntex Corporation were both named defendants, the court's decision
involved only Syntex Corporation's motion to dismiss. Id.
27. Wehner, 616 F. Supp. at 30 (dismissing complaint against Syntex Corp.); Bliss, 108 F.R.D.
at 132-33 (dismissing complaint against Syntex group for lack of personal jurisdiction under "con-
trol" theory). The Bliss court did find Syntex (U.S.A.) amenable to jurisdiction on a theory of
successor corporation liability. Bliss, 108 F.R.D. at 133-34.
28. Bliss, 108 F.R.D. at 131. The Bliss court explained that absent a provision for nationwide
service of process, exercise of jurisdiction over a non-resident rests upon the terms of a state's long-
arm statute and the constraints of due process. Id. at 129. To satisfy those two elements, the non-
resident must have minimum contacts with the state in which jurisdiction is sought. Id. at 130,
When the non-resident is a parent corporation, jurisdiction may rest upon the actions of its subsidi-
ary and a determination that those actions are attributable to the parent. Id. at 131. Thus, the
jurisdictional inquiry focuses upon the nature of the parent-subsidiary relationship. Id. at 131-32.
See also Wehner, 616 F. Supp. at 29-30.
29. Wehner, 616 F. Supp. at 29-30. Wehner recognized, however, that even when a subsidiary
is wholly-owned by the parent and thus the parent exercises considerable control over the subsidiary,
disregard of corporate separateness is not mandated. Id. at 29.
The Bliss court also appealed to traditional concepts of corporate alter-ego doctrine, indicating
that the test for subjecting the parent to jurisdiction is "whether the parent so dominates and con-
trols the subsidiary that the companies lose their separate identities." Bliss, 108 F.RD. at 131. The
Bliss standard is merely a generalized statement of the factors suggested by Wehner.
30. In Wehner, the court emphasized the fact that questions of jurisdiction over non-resident
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sidiary was merely an extension of the parent, courts imputed the subsid-
iary's contacts with the state to the parent. 31 Thus, personal jurisdiction
over the subsidiary established jurisdiction over the parent.32
The seminal case in the jurisdictional context is In re Acushnet River &
New Bedford Harbor Proceedings.33 Acushnet River arose out of an at-
tempt to recover costs incurred in the cleanup of the Avushnet river and
the New Bedford harbor.34 The government named RTE Corporation
(RTE) as one defendant. 35  RTE's wholly-owned subsidiary, Aerovox,
Inc. (Aerovox), had contaminated the river and harbor with highly toxic
polychlorinated biphenyls. 36  Recognizing that RTE lacked adequate
contacts with the forum state, the government attempted to base per-
sonal jurisdiction on Aerovox's status as RTE's alter ego. 7
Drawing upon caselaw from other contexts, the court recognized
"public convenience, fairness and equity" as the guiding principles in de-
veloping federal common law alter ego standards.38 Applying these gen-
eral principles, the court suggested several factors relevant to the alter
ego inquiry: undercapitalization of the subsidiary; extensive control by
the shareholder; shared property; and absence of corporate formalities
corporations are controlled by precepts of corporate law; that is, as two separately formed corpora-
tions, the parent and subsidiary are presumably distinct entities. Wehner, 616 F. Supp. at 29-30.
Therefore, the party seeking to exert jurisdiction must show that despite separate incorporation, the
actions of the subsidiary are in reality the actions of the parent. Id.
31. Bliss, 108 F.R.D. at 131.
32. Id.
33. 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987).
34. Id. at 22.
35. Id. at 25.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 28. Though finding several factors suggesting unity between the two entities, the
district court declined to pierce the corporate veil and exercise jurisdiction over the parent. Specifi-
cally, the court found the following: RTE used a centralized cash system in which Aerovox depos-
ited its cash receipts; RTE guaranteed an Aerovox loan; loans to Aerovox from RTE were
accomplished without formal loan agreements; large Aerovox expenditures required RTE approval;
Aerovox provided RTE with various financial reports; the two companies shared the same law firm;
and an umbrella insurance policy purchased by RTE named Aerovox as an insured. Id. at 34.
38. Id. at 33 (quoting Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215, 221 (1st Cir. 1981)). The
Acushnet River court also cited Seymour v. Hull & Moreland Engineering, 605 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir.
1979), which considered the veil piercing issue in the context of the jurisdiction provision of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C § 185(a) (1947). The Seymour court suggested that
three elements recur in the federal alter ego doctrine: the extent to which the corporate form is
respected by the shareholders, potential unfairness to the parties if the court respects the corporate
form, and fraudulent intent in incorporation. Id. at 1 11. At the same time, the court recognized
that one factor may receive more emphasis depending on the facts of the case as well as the policies
of the statute under which the suit is brought. Id.
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and separateness.39
The court rejected a standard that placed paramount importance on
the underlying goals of the statute,' but acknowledged that those poli-
cies should play some role in the decision. 41 Specifically, the court sug-
gested that the parent's role in the subsidiary's hazardous waste
management program and policies was a key factor in the alter ego
analysis.42
B. Statutory Construction
Development of a standard for piercing the corporate veil under CER-
CLA moved beyond the jurisdictional context in Joslyn Corp. v. T.L.
James & Co.43 Joslyn involved a private action to recover costs associ-
ated with the cleanup of a former wood treatment plant.4 Joslyn Corpo-
ration acquired the contaminated plant through the purchase of all the
assets of Lincoln Creosoting Co. (Lincoln), a subsidiary of T.L. James
Co.45 Lincoln was dissolved shortly after the sale to Joslyn.4 After the
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality ordered a clean-up of
the plant, Joslyn instituted a suit against T. L. James seeking compensa-
tion for the clean-up costs.4 7
As in the personal jurisdiction cases, the district court in Joslyn relied
upon traditional alter ego factors in evaluating the parent-subsidiary rela-
tionship.4" However, the district court stringently adhered to the basic
39. Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 33 (citations omitted). The court flatly rejected the govern-
ment's argument for a federal common law alter ego standard which would allow veil-piercing when
the parent-subsidiary relationship went beyond mere investment. Id. at 32. It found such a standard
to be completely unsupported by state or federal law. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 33-34. The government advocated a standard for disregarding the corporate form,
placing primary importance on equitable principles rather than on the factors articulated by the
court. Id. at 31-32. The court rejected such a focus as setting too low a threshold for piercing the
corporate veil and thus subverting one of the primary purposes of incorporation, limited liability. Id.
at 32.
42. Id. at 33-34.
43. 696 F. Supp. 222 (W.D. La. 1988), aff'd, Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80
(5th Cir. 1990).
44. 696 F. Supp. at 224.
45. Id. at 228-30.
46. Id. at 230.
47. Id. at 223-24.
48. Id. at 227. The court concluded that establishing a federal rule of decision for parent liabil-
ity under CERCLA was unnecessary because the alter ego standard of the Fifth Circuit did not vary
substantially from state law. Id. at 226.
The court deemed relevant the following factors: commonality of stock, directors or officers;
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doctrine of corporate separateness,4 9 and attached negligible significance
to equitable considerations.5 0 After assessing the parent-subsidiary rela-
tionship under this more stringent standard, the district court refused to
pierce the corporate veil."
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit emphatically affirmed the "mere instru-
mentality" approach as the appropriate veil piercing standard under
CERCLA 2 The court maintained that departure from the well-en-
trenched tenet of limited liability53 requires a clearer congressional direc-
tive. 4 Because CERCLA does not explicitly include parent corporations
within the definition of owner/operator 5 and the legislative history fails
shared financial statements; subsidiary undercapitalization; subsidiary's only business comes from
the parent; and daily operations are not separate. Id. at 227.
49. The Joslyn court's analysis takes its cue from cases piercing the veil only when the parent's
control over the subsidiary "amounts to total domination ... to the extent that the subservient
corporation manifests no separate corporate interests of its own and functions solely to achieve the
purposes of" the parent. Id. at 227 (quoting Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers &
Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1103 (5th Cir. 1973)). While the Acushnet River court drew upon the
policies of the Act and equitable concerns in its analysis, the Joslyn court assessed corporate sepa-
rateness as if in a vacuum. Compare Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 33-35 with Joslyn, 696 F. Supp.
at 225-26. Under this standard, disregard of the corporate entity requires that the parent's misuse of
its control over the subsidiary proximately caused the injury. Joslyn, 696 F. Supp. at 225-26. The
court in Joslyn adamantly rejected the theory of direct liability adopted by other courts. See infra
Part III. It concluded that those courts improperly departed from corporate law principles in the
absence of explicit congressional mandate. Id. at 225. The court found disregard of the limited
liability standard a complete derogation of established corporate law. Id.
50. Joslyn, 696 F. Supp. at 225. Citing with approval Homan & Crimen, Inc. v. Harris, 626
F.2d 1201, 1208, reh'g denied, 633 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 975 (1981), the
court emphasized that despite the often artificial nature of corporate-shareholder separateness, sub-
stance is rarely subordinated to form, and injustice and unfairness are inadequate bases for disregard
of the legal fiction. 696 F. Supp. at 225.
51. Joslyn, 696 F. Supp. at 231. While Lincoln and T.L. James shared corporate officers and
T.L. James controlled the financial affairs of its subsidiary, the court found that the relationship
lacked the pervasive unity required to pierce the corporate veil. Id. at 230-31.
52. Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).
53. Echoing the lower court's argument, the Fifth Circuit stated that to find a parent corpora-
tion liable as an owner/operator "would dramatically alter traditional concepts of corporation law."
id. at 82.
54. Id. at 83.
55. Id. at 82. The Fifth Circuit clearly found untenable an interpretation of the owner/-
operator language within section 107 imposing direct liability upon the parent corporation. The
court found congressional intent to so expand parent corporation liability lacking in light of the fact
that CERCLA defines the term "controlled" in relation to persons formerly associated with facilities
conveyed to the government by abandonment, bankruptcy, tax delinquency or otherwise. Id. at 83
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20XAXiii)). The statute contains no similar control language with respect
to other owner/operators. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii)).
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to resolve the issue,56 the court felt compelled to adhere to a standard
requiring the highest deference to the corporate form.17 The Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded that disregarding the corporate entity is justified only
when recognition of the corporate form is tantamount to fraud.5,
III. THE "DIRECT LIABILITY" THEORY
A. Officer and Shareholder Liability
The direct liability approach originated in cases in which plaintiffs
sought recovery from individual corporate directors, officers 9 or share-
holders for costs incurred in cleaning up the corporation's hazardous
waste.' Courts impose liability on individual officers or shareholders
56. Id. at 82.
57. Id. at 83-84. Not all courts have reached the same conclusion concerning the failure of
Congress to address corporate liability under CERCLA. In United States v. Mottolo, the court found
those same factors, broad language and lack of explicit directive, along with the statute's strict liabil-
ity framework, to imply that "CERCLA places no importance on the corporate form." 695 F. Supp.
615, 624 (D.N.H. 1988) (emphasis added).
58. Joslyn, 893 F.2d at 83 ("Veil piercing should be limited to situations in which the corporate
entity is used as a sham to perpetrate a fraud or avoid personal liability.") (emphasis in original).
The Fifth Circuit's decision reflects an emerging trend toward limiting the scope of liability under
Superfund. The Court of Appeals cited with approval a Seventh Circuit decision similarly refusing
to expand the definition of owner/operator. Id. at 83 (citing Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan
Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988)). In Edward Hines, the court responded to the argu-
ment that the underlying goals of CERCLA should guide its construction of the statute:
To the point that courts could achieve "more" of the legislative objectives by adding to the
lists of those responsible, it is enough to respond that statutes have not only ends but limits.
Born of compromise, laws such as CERCLA and SARA do not pursue their ends to their
logical limits. A court's job is to find and enforce stopping points no less than to imple-
ment legislative choices.
Edward Hines, 861 F.2d at 157 (citations omitted). Thus, the Seventh Circuit declined to hold a
supplier of wood-preserving chemicals liable as an owner/operator even though the supplier built a
wood treating plant for a lumber company, trained the lumber company's employees to operate the
plant's equipment and allowed the lumber company to use its trademark for the treated wood. The
court concluded that, because the lumber company controlled the employees and the manufacture
and sale of the treated wood, the supplier was not liable. Id. at 156-58.
59. United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 827-28 (W.D. Mo.
1984) ("NEPACCO"), aff'd in relevant part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 146 (1987) (shift supervisor, vice-president, founder, and president); United States v. Bliss,
667 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (president and vice-president); United States v. Mottolo,
605 F. Supp. 898, 913 (D.N.H. 1985) (president and treasurer); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp.
1326, 1330 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (owners of dumpsite and disposal company); United States v. Carolawn
Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,699 (Envtl. L. Inst.) (D.S.C. June 15, 1984) (officers).
60. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (officer and stockholder);
Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. at 913; NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 827-28. In these cases the individuals
from whom recovery was sought were both corporate officers or directors and shareholders.
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primarily in two contexts:61 1) when the person arranges for disposal62 or
2) when the person owns or operates a facility.63
In the first context, liability under section 107(a)(3) is based on
whether the particular individual has specific responsibility for the haz-
ardous waste disposal practices.' Section 107(a)(3) allows recovery
when the party "arranged for disposal or treatment" or transport of the
hazardous waste.65 Despite the fact that such an arrangement falls
within the official's corporate duties and, therefore, arguably is on behalf
of the corporation,66 the courts' broad interpretation of section
107(a)(3) 67 precludes the need to utilize alter-ego theories of liability.6
In the second context courts impose liability when the particular indi-
vidual exerts control over the management of the polluting corporation
sufficient to characterize the party as the owner or operator of the facil-
ity.69 While overall control is significant70 courts weigh heavily the indi-
61. An exception to these two bases for liability is United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326
(E.D. Pa. 1983). In Wade, the individual corporate officer/shareholder did not own the hazardous
waste site itself. Rather, he owned the disposal company which processed the hazardous materials.
Id. at 1330. The court considered the officer's liability under § 107(a)(4), which imposes liability on
transporters. See supra note 5. It is unclear why the court chose this particular section. However,
the court's analysis does not depart from the theories utilized in the cases considering liability under
§§ 107(a)(2) or (3). See, eg., Carolawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,700. In Wade, the court concluded
that the corporate form could not shield an officer from liability if he or she participates in the
wrongful act. 577 F. Supp. at 1341 (citations omitted).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(aX3) (Supp. 1987). See supra note 5.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(aX1) (Supp. 1987). See supra note 5.
64. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 847 (vice-president); Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at 1306 (chief execu-
tive officer); Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. at 914 (president, treasurer and sole shareholder). As noted
earlier, specific responsibility could also arise from § 9607(a)(4). See supra note 61. Because the
analysis does not differ from that issue under § 9607(a)(3), it will not be treated separately. See
United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (discussion of disposal company
owner's liability under § 9607(a)(4)).
65. See supra note 5 for the text of section 107(a)(3).
66. Several courts support their interpretation of individual officer liability by drawing upon the
common law notion that where an employee participates in wrongful conduct he or she may not seek
protection of the corporate shield. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. at 914 (corporate officer may be held liable
if he personally participates in the wrongful, injury-producing act); Carolawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. at
20,700 (no protection for tortious conduct); Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1341 (same).
67. For example, the NEPACCO court advocated construing § 9601(21)'s definition of "per-
son" liberally so as to include both the employee and the corporation. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at
848.
68. Id. at 849; Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. at 913-14 (state's failure to raise alter-ego doctrine did not
entitle individual to judgment, as liability may be imposed directly under § 9607(a)(3)).
69. The definition of "owner or operator" is found at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (Supp. 1987). The
portion relevant to this Note provides:
The term "owner or operator" means... in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore
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vidual's participation in the hazardous waste management procedures as
well.71
Although the cases dealing with individual liability premise recovery
on different subdivisions of section 107,72 they all focus upon the individ-
ual's relationship to the polluting corporation.73 Interpreted literally,
section 107 links liability to a person's control over the facility's disposal
practices, either through participatory ownership74 or through actual
conduct.71 Therefore, the extent of the person's responsibility for the ac-
facility, any person owning or operating such facility.... Such term does not include a
person, who without participating in the management of a... facility, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the.., facility.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii) (Supp. 1987).
While CERCLA's liability provision, section 107(a)(1), utilizes the conjunctive, "owner and oper-
ator," courts interpret the phrase in the disjunctive and premise liability solely on the "operator"
portion. In New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985), the Second
Circuit held that a stockholder who participated in the management of the responsible corporation
was liable as an operator under section 107. The court based its analysis on the "owner or operator"
language found within the definitional provision. Id. The court interpreted the section, which ex-
empts from the definition of owner or operator "a person, who, without participating in the manage-
ment of a ... facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the
facility," as an implicit recognition that stockholders who do participate in management are liable
under CERCLA. Id. at 1052 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (Supp. 1987)). Though acknowledg-
ing that the stockholder in question could be held liable as an owner/operator as well, the court
restricted its holding to the operator language. Id. See also Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1037, 1052
(majority shareholder found liable as an operator); NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 848-49 (vice-presi-
dent and majority shareholder found liable as an owner/operator); Carolawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. at
20,700 (corporate officers operated facility within the general scope of § 107).
70. The NEPACCO court focused on the defendant vice-president's capacity and power to con-
trol and abate the hazardous waste disposal practices at the site. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 849.
This language points to a larger spectrum of potential liability because it suggests that mere ability
rather than actual participation in disposal practices is a sufficient ground for responsibility. Id.
Moreover, the court's acknowledgement that to shield such a corporate officer from liability would
frustrate Congress' purpose by "exempting a large class of persons who are uniquely qualified to
assume the burden imposed by [CERCLA] reinforces this interpretation." Id. (quoting Apex Oil
Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1291, 1293 (8th Cir. 1976)). The scope of the NEPACCO decision
remains unclear, however, because the vice-president had established and directed the facility's waste
disposal procedures. Id. at 847. See also Carolawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,700.
71. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 848; Carolawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,700.
72. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 59-61, 69-70.
74. Courts clearly include establishing or administering a facility's waste disposal program in
defining participatory "ownership". U.S. v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 747-48
(W.D. Mich. 1987); Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. at 913-14. Liability may also arise from control over the
general operations of the corporation. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1052; NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at
849; Carolawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,700. See also supra notes 68-69.
75. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at 1306 (actually arranged for disposal of waste); Mottolo, 605 F. Supp.
at 914 (personal participation); NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 847 (direct responsibility for arranging
transportation of waste).
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tivities of the corporation emerges as the dominant factor in determining
liability. Because the definition of the term "person" within CERCLA
includes corporations,76 courts apply theories of individual shareholder
liability in the context of parent corporation liability.77
B. Direct Parent Liability
Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co.,78 extended the theory of liability developed
in the individual shareholder/officer cases to corporate shareholders.79
The court held that a parent corporation is directly liable for its subsidi-
ary's pollution if the parent owns or operates the subsidiary within the
meaning of CERCLA.80 The court's test focused on the parent's capac-
ity to discover hazardous releases and to abate them, and on the parent's
power to control the activities of persons responsible for the pollution.81
Similarly, in Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 2 the court found that
the parent was an operator and, therefore, held it directly liable for its
76. CERCLA defines "person" in § 9601(21) as "an individual, firm, corporation, association,
partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, munici-
pality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21)
(Supp. 1987).
77. See infra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
78. 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
79. In Bunker Hill, the state sought to impose liability on Gulf Corporation whose wholly-
owned subsidiary, Bunker Hill Company, caused the contamination. Id. at 670.
80. Id. at 672. More recently in Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822 (D. Vt. 1988), a court
employed reasoning similar to that in Bunker Hill in holding individual managing shareholders, the
parent corporation and a sister subsidiary liable for response costs. Though providing little explana-
tion, the court seemed to consider the control and management exerted over the offending subsidiary
as the operative element. Id. at 831-32.
81. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 672. The court concluded in the case at bar that the parent
exercised the requisite control over its subsidiary to be considered an owner/operator under CER-
CLA. Id. at 672. The court's decision stemmed from a fact-based analysis similar to that employed
in the more stringent alter ego cases. See supra notes 25-58 and accompanying text. The Bunker
Hill court found that the parent controlled its subsidiary's board of directors, required the subsidiary
to obtain permission prior to any substantial expenditure for pollution abatement procedures, de-
rived significant financial benefit from the undercapitalized subsidiary's business and could overrule
the subsidiary's management decisions. Id. at 670.
While the Bunker Hill court found the reasoning in NEPACCO, persuasive, the district court in
Rockwell International v. IUInternational Corp. viewed the definition as too expansive. 702 F. Supp.
1384, 1390 (N.D. Ill. 1988). The Rockwell court rejected that portion of the NEPACCO decision
suggesting that capacity arising solely from financial control is sufficient to hold a parent liable as an
owner. Id. at 1390 (citing United States v. Mirabile, 10 Chem. & Rad. Waste Lit. Rep. 668, 670-71
(E.D. Pa. 1985)). Expressly declining to address whether the parent could be held liable under a
veil-piercing analysis, the court found the parent liable as an operator. Rockwell, 702 F. Supp. at
1391.
82. 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,578 (D. Colo. April 29, 1987).
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subsidiary's pollution. 3 The court relied on several of the factors used in
the veil-piercing analysis noted in Acushnet River84 and Joslyn. 5 The
court also held liable as an operator a sister corporation charged with
providing employees for the subsidiary.86 The court considered CER-
CLA's purpose in construing its provisions and in determining the stan-
dard governing the imposition of liability.87
C. Translating Direct Liability into a Federal Rule
In United States v. Nicolet, 88 the court converted the Bunker Hill test
for direct parental liability into a federal common law standard for pierc-
ing the corporate veil.89 Promoting the goal of preventing "fraud, illegal-
ity or injustice, or . . . [the] defeat [of] public policy" 90 the court
articulated a federal rule of decision based on the degree of control ex-
83. Id. at 20,579. The parent in Idarado Mining, Newmont Mining Corp., was a majority
shareholder in the polluting company, Idarado Mining Co. Id. at 20,578. In addition, the two
companies shared interlocking boards of directors and officers and the parent company provided
services to the subsidiary in return for a fee. Id.
84. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 43-58 and accompanying text. In assessing the parent's potential liability as
an owner/operator, the court in Idarado Mining considered the definition of "person in charge" as
found within the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Idarado Mining, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,578
(citing United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 848 (W.D. Mo.
1984)). The court considered the extent of the parent's ownership, the parent's participation in the
subsidiary's marketing and contractual practices, and the role of the parent in selecting and control-
ling the subsidiary's employees. Idarado Mining, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,578 (citing United States v.
Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 416-420 (W.D. Mo. 1985)).
86. Idarado Mining, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,599. Although the Idarado Mining court looked to
factors similar to those in an alter-ego analysis, the fact that it chose to hold the sister subsidiary
liable suggests that unlike the Joslyn orAcushnet River courts it found strict adherence to the corpo-
rate fiction inappropriate in the context of CERCLA. The court implies that the factors themselves
merely indicate "the degree to which [the parent or sister] participated in the operation." Id. at
20,578.
87. Id. at 20,579. The court stated "[a]s a practical matter, if mere interposition of a separate
corporate entity could insulate against CERCLA liability, it would be far too easy to evade the
statute." Id.
88. 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989). In Nicolet, the government sought recovery from the
current owner of a waste site for the costs of abating the release of asbestos. In addition to the
current owner, Nicolet, the government impleaded Turner & Newall ("Overseas"), the parent com-
pany of the former owner and operator of the site, Keasbey & Mattison Company ("Keasbey"). Id.
At the time of the litigation, Keasbey had been defunct for over 20 years. Id. By the date set for
trial, Nicolet had filed for reorganization and had entered into a settlement agreement with the
government. Id. at 1195-96.
89. Id. at 1202.
90. Id. at 1202 (quoting American Bell Inc. v. Federation of Tel. Workers, 736 F.2d 879, 886
(3d Cir. 1984)).
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erted by the parent over the management and operations of the
subsidiary.9"
The court, however, failed to indicate the level of control necessary to
trigger liability.92 The court did provide some implicit guidance. First,
the court considered the parent's capacity to control its subsidiary's haz-
ardous waste disposal practices rather than focusing upon the parent's
actual control. 93 Second, the court determined whether the parent some-
how benefited from those practices.94 Thus, the court's discussion sug-
gests that to trigger liability a lower level of unity is needed between the
parent and subsidiary than that found in the traditional alter ego
doctrine.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE STANDARDS
An examination of the cases that formulate a federal rule of decision
for piercing the corporate veil under CERCLA reveals two very different
approaches, despite the goal of uniformity. The difference lies not so
much in the courts' terminology, but rather the distinction seems to rest,
at least in part, on the interrelationship of underlying policy preferences;
that is, how a particular court perceives its role in interpreting a statute,
and what goals it seeks to further through that interpretation. These fac-
tors assume greater significance when the language of the statute fails to
provide an explicit directive-for example, CERCLA's liability provi-
sion. Thus, the differences between the alter-ego and direct liability stan-
dards arise from divergent judicial approaches to interpreting the broad
statutory language. The courts' analyses are further divided by the con-
flict of whether to place greater emphasis on the integrity of the corpo-
rate form or on the statute's goal of allowing for the recovery of response
costs associated with the cleanup of hazardous waste sites.
Courts that follow the first approach of adhering to the "traditional
91. Id. at 1202.
92. Because the Nicolet decision involved the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court did not
apply its rule to a concrete factual situation. Id. at 1196.
93. Id. at 1202. The court's standard focuses on the subsidiary's action as an "extension of the
parent, subject to its knowledge and involvement." Id. (quoting Berkowitz v. Allied Stores of Penn-
Ohio, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 1209, 1215 (E.D. Pa. 1982)). See also supra note 80 and accompanying text
(discussing the "capacity to control" standard).
94. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1201. The court emphasized that a primary objective of CERCLA
is to ensure that parties do not profit from lax hazardous waste management procedures. Id. at 1204
("Congress has determined that the persons who bore the fruits of hazardous waste disposal also
bear the costs of cleaning it up." (quoting Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 672)).
1990]
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common-law standard,"95 take the position that statutory silence im-
poses limits on judicial construction. They conclude that the absence of
any express congressional directive militates against departure from well-
established legal norms.96 The presence of a clearly recognized principle
of law which runs contrary to a broader reading of the statute's language
only reinforces their restraint.17
The Fifth Circuit's ruling in Joslyn represents a classic example of this
approach to statutory construction.9" The court maintains a healthy def-
erence to congressional legislative authority,99 and its standard for disre-
garding the corporate entity finds support in other judicial decisions. °0
The opinion aligns parent liability under CERCLA with one of the cardi-
nal objectives of corporate law: limited shareholder liability. 1'0 Thus, it
promotes a standard of liability consistent with the expectations of cor-
porate defendants.
Such a rigid approach, however, takes an unduly narrow view of the
equitable considerations underlying alter-ego analysis."0 2 Limiting veil
piercing to circumstances in which the parent corporation utilizes its
subsidiary for fraudulent purposes ignores the objectives of CERCLA.
Though Congress failed to articulate these objectives clearly, they are
fully understood and should guide the standard for disregarding the cor-
porate form. Congress envisioned that CERCLA's liability provision
would shift the costs of cleanup to those responsible for the environmen-
95. Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222 (W.D. La. 1988), aff'd, Joslyn Mfg. Co.
v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor
Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987).
96. Id.
97. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
98. Various commentators herald the Fifth Circuit's decision in Joslyn as extremely significant,
not only as the first appellate court decision on the veil-piercing question, but as a departure from the
more liberal trend of holding parent corporations liable. Inside EPA, Feb. 9, 1990, at 7; Wall St. J.,
Jan. 30, 1990, at B6, col. 1. The EPA, although not a party to the case, stated that the court's ruling
may present an obstacle to pursuing recovery costs. Inside EPA, Feb. 9, 1990, at 7. Moreover, an
unidentified source at the EPA expressed concern that the decision would "encourage corporations
to seek ways to avoid liability for Superfund cleanup." Id. According to Inside EPA, the agency and
the Department of Justice are currently exploring possible ways to limit the decision's impact on
future recovery suits. Id.
99. The court states that "[a]ny bold rewriting of corporation law in this area is best left to
Congress." Joslyn, 893 F.2d at 83.
100. Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen Local 210, 843 F.2d 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3155 (1989); United States v. Jon-T Chem., Inc., 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir.
1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986).
101. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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tal contamination, 103 regardless of fault. The Joslyn standard subverts
this goal by requiring such a high degree of unity between the parent
corporation and its subsidiary.
Congress clearly viewed CERCLA as a means of cleaning up inactive
or abandoned waste sites."° The successful implementation of that ob-
jective depends on the ability to obtain the necessary financial resources
to fund the cleanup."' 5 Due to the nature of the targeted sites, the corpo-
ration which caused the actual contamination often no longer exists. As
a result, the costs of the cleanup fall upon either the government or the
subsequent owner,"° 6 neither of whom contributed to the hazardous
waste problem.107 If the defunct corporation was a subsidiary of an ex-
isting parent company, the innocent parties financing the cleanup have
almost no recourse against the parent corporation under the stringent
veil piercing test posited by the Fifth Circuit. 108 Such a result runs con-
trary to notions of fairness and equitable treatment under the law and to
the intentions of Congress.
Courts that seek to develop an alter ego standard consistent with the
framework of the statute accept a lower threshold for imposing liability
103. See supra note 93. See also Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 671-72 (D. Idaho
1986) (citing United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 84849 (W.D.
Mo. 1984)).
104. See Preamble, Superfund, Pub. L. No. 96-510 (1980). For the text of the preamble, see
supra note 3.
105. The EPA originally envisioned Superfund as the primary source of necessary funding with
recovery from potentially responsible parties through litigation taking a secondary role. Superfund:
A Major Task Ahead, EPA J., June 1981, at 11 (interview with Michael B. Cook, first Deputy
Assistant Administrator, Office of Hazardous Emergency Response). However, the high costs of
cleanup resulted in the recognition that a large portion of the financing would have to come from the
private parties responsible for the contamination. See EPA Memorandum on Interim CERCLA
Settlement Policy from Lee M. Thomas, Courtney M. Price and F. Henry Habicht, II (Dec. 5,
1984), reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION at 497 (ALI-ABA June 1986); Marzulla, Depart-
ment of Justice Enforcement Strategies, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 75, 78 (ALI-ABA Feb. 1986).
106. See, ag., Joslyn, 696 F. Supp. at 230; Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1196.
107. The inequity of this situation is underscored by the potential enormity of cleanup costs. On
average, cleanup of a Superfund site costs from $30 million to $100 million. The EPA projects that
over 2,100 Superfund sites will exist by the year 2,000 and estimates the cost of fully cleaning up
those sites at a half a trillion dollars. Cahan, Gutterridge, Havel, & Crough, EnvironmentalAspects
of Secured Transactions, ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN BUSINESS TRANsAcTIoNs 149, 152 (M. Bern-
stein, R. Carrick & S. Spracker, Co-chairmen 1989).
108. This scenario parallels the actual circumstances at issue in Joslyn. See supra notes 43-47
and accompanying text. The attorney for Joslyn noted "We think this result is highly inequitable. A
company that didn't profit from the polluting activities may have to pay for the cleanup and the
parent company can walk away." Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1990, at B6, col. 1.
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on the parent corporations.' 9 For these courts the breadth of the terms
as well as the remedial purposes of the Act dictate an expanded construc-
tion of CERCLA's liability provision."1 Rather than construing the
statute's silence on the terms of parent liability as signaling restraint,
they view it as an invitation to develop rules which better effectuate Con-
gress' goals. 11'
The Nicolet opinion is the "direct liability" counterpart to Joslyn. The
Nicolet court premised its standard not only on the language and goals of
the statute, but also on a tradition of affording greater emphasis to equi-
table factors in alter-ego cases.' 12 That tradition underscored the crea-
tion of an alter-ego test guided by the statute under which it is applied. 1 3
Thus, the Nicolet court found that the terms of section 107, which permit
the imposition of liability directly upon parent corporations as owners or
operators," 4 along with the goal of requiring those benefiting from dispo-
sal activities to assume responsibility for cleanup costs, counsels a veil
piercing standard reflecting equitable factors." 5
Unlike the common law approach, the Nicolet standard permits courts
to hold a broader class of parent corporations liable for pollution caused
by their subsidiaries. While the Joslyn approach is underinclusive, the
Nicolet standard does not represent that problem's corollary. Nicolet
perhaps extends liability beyond strict traditional bounds, but it retains
deference to the integrity of the corporate form by requiring the parent to
exercise or to be in the position to exercise control over the subsidiary's
hazardous waste management practices before imposing liability."1 6
The Nicolet court's formulation of a federal rule for disregarding the
corporate entity is preferable. Such a standard promotes a more equita-
109. See supra notes 59-96 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 19, 64, 73, 86 and accompanying text.
111. See United States v. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1989) ("Congress expected
the courts to develop a federal common law to supplement the statute.") (quoting Smith Land &
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex, 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988)); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F.
Supp. 615, 624 (D.N.H. 1988). For a view considering limitations on that expectation, see Edward
Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
112. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1202 (citations omitted).
113. In formulating an alter-ego standard, courts should consider the statute's purpose to "deter-
mine whether [it] places importance on the corporate form, an inquiry that usually gives less respect
to the corporate form than does the strict common law alter ego doctrine." Alman v. Danin, 801
F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1986) (quoting Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215, 221 (Ist Cir. 1981)
(citations omitted)). The Alman court considered piercing the corporate veil under ERISA.
114. See supra note 68.




PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL UNDER CERCLA
ble imposition of liability, narrowing the circumstances under which in-
nocent parties or the public will bear the burden not only of
environmental degradation, but of the costs of rectifying that harm.1 7
In addition, a standard imposing liability at a lower level of unity be-
tween parent and subsidiary may deter the use of inadequate waste man-
agement practices. The threat of liability should encourage parent
corporations exerting managerial control over their subsidiaries to imple-
ment safer, more effective procedures. Finally, because of the wide-rang-
ing health and safety implications involved courts must strike a balance
in favor of funding environmental cleanup as opposed to preserving the
principles of corporate limited liability.
CONCLUSION
The existence of two approaches for veil piercing under CERCLA
defeats the fundamental purpose of developing a federal rule of decision:
uniformity of result. True uniformity requires an explicit congressional
mandate. Because of the fact-specific nature of alter-ego analysis, a rule
setting forth the exact terms of parent liability is not the answer. Rather,
Congress should clarify in general terms the importance of protecting the
corporate form. For clarity Congress should alter the statute's
owner/operator language'Is to include 19 shareholders who participate in
the management of a facility's operations. Such an amendment would
suggest a broader scope of potentially responsible parties. At the same
time such an alteration affords the courts considerable discretion to eval-
uate shareholder liability within a variety of discrete factual contexts.
This is only one possible alternative. For ultimate resolution of the veil
piercing controversy, Congress will need to address who should bear the
costs of hazardous waste contamination.
Elizabeth A. Noonan
117. See supra notes 59-96 and accompanying text. Perhaps the only way to entirely prevent
innocent parties from assuming liability in the parent-subsidiary situation is to impose liability on the
parent when the subsidiary is incapable of financial contribution regardless of the former's involve-
ment. The federal government advocated this rule in its amicus brief filed inJoslyn. Wall St. J., Jan.
30, 1990 at B6, col. 1.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (Supp. 1987).
119. Congress drafted the language in terms of the exclusion of shareholders who fail to partici-
pate in management of the facility. See supra note 68 for the text of § 9601(20)(A). Changing the
language to an affirmative inclusion establishes stronger grounds for expanding the scope of liability.
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